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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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CONTRADICTIONS WEAKEN WALLACE'S PLEA FOR NEW FOREIGN POLICY

THE questions about Germany's future position in Europe, as affected by and, in turn, affecting the relations of the United States with Russia, which had been raised by the Stuttgart speech of Secretary of State Byrnes, have been thrown into new focus as a result of the controversy aroused by Secretary of Commerce Wallace when he addressed the PAC rally in Madison Square Garden on September 12. The two speeches reveal a divergence concerning the objectives of United States foreign policy which cannot fail to trouble European countries at a time when Mr. Byrnes is trying to convince them that the American people have reached fundamental agreement on this nation's rôle in world affairs.

It is both a quality and a weakness of democracy that, except in time of critical emergency, it speaks with many voices, expressing widely differing opinions on public questions. Whether or not it is proper for one member of the cabinet to state publicly views that contradict the policy ostensibly being followed, with the avowed support and approval of the President, by the Secretary of State is a debatable question under our form of government. The danger that, under these circumstances, foreign policy may become a political football—as has been surmised in this instance by some observers who believe Mr. Wallace may have been hoping to recapture for the democratic party voters who have been alienated by Washington's stiffened attitude toward Russia.

From the point of view of foreign policy tactics, the government advisers had begun to feel that, an understandable and necessary endeavor to unify its own position in Europe, the United States had recently become inclined to oppose Russia on a minor point after another, instead of grappling with the larger political and economic issues at stake in our relations with that country. There was also

growing danger that some Americans—more numerous than is generally realized—who with frivolous cynicism have been saying that, since war with Russia was inevitable sooner or later, the United States should get the job over with by dropping a few atomic bombs on the U.S.S.R., might create the impression abroad that we were getting ready for World War III. Some corrective of these trends was needed—but it is doubtful that the corrective provided by Mr. Wallace was expressed in the constructive terms at this time.

IMPERIALISM FOR WHOM? To denounce Britain for imperialism in the Near and Middle East at a time when the British are making a genuine attempt to terminate their principal commitments in India and Egypt, is not only to rehash outworn clichés; it is also to overlook the fact that, even if Britain did not exist, the United States, as a result of World War II, has interests of its own in that area, interests concerned, like those of Britain, with strategic bases and oil. Moreover, if we accept Mr. Wallace's division of the world into spheres of influence—with Russia enjoying a dominant position in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and the United States in Latin America—why refuse to let Britain have its own sphere in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East? Had Mr. Wallace taken his stand on the high ground of moral principles in international relations, he might have been able to make a cogent argument against the perpetuation of British imperial interests where they continue to exist. Instead, he definitely aligned himself with the hard-boiled school of thought which favors division of the world into orbits, arguing that the United States has no more right to interfere in Russia's orbit than Russia has to interfere in ours. Why, then, should either we or the Russians claim the

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right to interfere in Britain's orbit?

TWO ORBITS OR ONE WORLD? The fallacy of a system of self-contained orbits has in any case been demonstrated by events since the end of hostilities, for the simple reason that no dynamic nation stops at a given geographic boundary of its own free will, and none can be effectively prevented from taking an interest in the affairs of others unless we resort to a really impenetrable "iron curtain" between orbits through censorship, repression of opposition views, and so on. Mr. Wallace's concept of the world could easily be interpreted abroad as a new form of isolationism—although that is undoubtedly contrary to his personal philosophy. For what he proposes is the isolation of the United States and Russia, each in its own sphere of influence, the exact limits of which he does not undertake to define; and he strengthens this impression by declaring that the United States has no right to concern itself with developments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and presumably also in Russia's zone of Germany, on the assumption that the situation of that area is comparable to that of Latin America. Yet Mr. Wallace, a close adviser of President Roosevelt throughout the war years, must be aware that at Yalta Stalin accepted, for better or worse, certain joint commitments concerning the political future of Poland and the Axis satellites, and therefore the United States and Britain have the right to inquire into the fulfil-

ment of these commitments, even though the manner and object of their inquiries may be open to criticism on the part of Moscow. Most astonishing of all is Mr. Wallace's remark that, once the American and Russian spheres of influence have been mutually recognized, "the United Nations should have a really great power in those areas which are truly international and not regional." What "international" areas would be left after this arbitrary division of the world between the two great powers? And what rôle would the United Nations play anywhere if it can operate only within limits laid down by the United States and Russia?

Mr. Wallace's speech reveals the confusion of thought that has been caused in this country by unreasoning fear of Russia on one side, and equally unreasoning adulation of everything Russia does on the other. One does not have to look to Moscow for an explanation of strikes in this country in a period of mounting prices. Neither is it necessary to blacken the reputation of other nations in order to enhance that of Russia or to facilitate our relations with that country. If we can keep our feet on solid ground, we shall find that on some matters we agree with Russia, on others with Britain, and on a whole range of still others with neither of them. For revealing examples of this situation we need only to turn again to Germany.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS CAN U.S. TAKE IN CHINA?

Despite almost daily reports of Chinese government advances in current offensives against the Communist areas, it is far too early to draw conclusions about the campaign. The main feature of operations in the past few weeks is that, pressed by Central forces possessing superior American equipment and American airplanes, the Communist armies have evacuated with little resistance a number of points in the North China regions. Their retreating forces, however, remain intact for possible future operations on battlefields adapted to their own strength and strategy.

WHAT PATH FOR U.S.? So far the fighting conforms to the pattern indicated by interviews in Nanking in June, before the beginning of the government's campaign. One well-informed official, who was out of sympathy with the policies of the dominant political and military leaders, declared privately at that time: "We can drive the Communists back from the railways and out of certain areas. But what then? Conditions will be worse than before! And this will be only the beginning of the military struggle!" It is necessary to emphasize these points now, because some of the recent dispatches from China suggest a dangerously incorrect conclusion—that Nanking's successes are likely in some way to be decisive. From this it would only

be a step to the view that the problems of American policy in China may soon be resolved on the field of battle. Actually, the situation in China is likely to become more critical, and reconsideration of American policy is more pressing than ever.

It is interesting, on returning to this country after an absence of several months, to read newspaper editorials on China. Some publications support our recent policy to the full and urge maximum aid to Chiang Kai-shek; others call sharply for an end to American intervention on the government side; and still others recognize the inadequacy of American policy without knowing what to do beyond deplo- ing the way in which our golden opportunity of the past year to promote peace and reconstruction in China has been lost.

WOULD COMMUNISTS RULE COALITION

One crucial question constantly asked is this: If genuine coalition government were formed, would it not soon be dominated by the Communists because of the weakness of the liberals and other non-Communist forward-looking elements in China? It is true that the Chinese middle class is weak and that the non-Communist progressives are in a precarious position—in part because both historically and today they have received little encouragement from the Western powers. Nevertheless, the ques-

tion underestimates the strength of the non-Communist, non-reactionary groups. It should be noted that in any coalition régime the non-Communist troops of the present Central government would continue to form a majority of the total armed forces of the country. The liberals and conservatives who have been out of sympathy with government policy would also for the first time in many years have a chance to develop and increase their strength.

Moreover, a coalition régime would not be set up simply along lines desired by the Communists. On the contrary, the form of government agreed to by the Communists and the Central representatives last January favors the Kuomintang and other non-Communist groups in important respects. The formal composition of a government cannot, of course, by itself determine questions of power, but in the past analysis no constitutional arrangements for a coalition administration can guarantee the survival of any elements which do not develop a program enabling them to secure popular support. What can be said at this point, however, is that the initiation of a genuine coalition government, in accordance with the January arrangements, would give the progressive non-Communist members an excellent opportunity for survival and expansion.

REVISING OUR POLICY. Today China is a long way from having a coalition régime, but the first step in bringing it about, as far as the United States is concerned, is to withhold further economic or military assistance, except for relief, until such a government is formed. A corollary move would be to make it absolutely clear to Nanking that we oppose the use of American lend-lease and surplus property in civil war operations. A third step would be to reaffirm our confidence in the basic soundness of the Political Consultative Conference decisions and the Government-Communist military pact.

A fourth, overdue step is to withdraw all American marines from China by a fixed, early date. Although not numerous enough to have a crucial effect on the Chinese situation, they are of moral and material value to Nanking in the civil war, and their presence irritates significant sections of Chinese public opinion. On the other hand, these twenty-odd thousand men certainly do not have the effect, as some American circles suppose, of "keeping the Russians out of China."

RUSSIA'S INTENTIONS. This discussion naturally raises the question: What will Russia do? At the moment, beyond maintaining some troops in

South Manchuria—apparently in accordance with the Sino-Soviet pact of 1945—Moscow seems to be playing a watching rôle. It is true that last winter the Russians placed obstacles in the way of the Central government's entering Manchuria and that their presence made it easier for the Chinese Communists to take over the weapons of defeated Japanese troops than if a hostile power had been in occupation. But it is likely that if no foreign military activity—Russian or American—had occurred in China after V-J Day the Communists would have done at least as well in Manchuria, and perhaps even better. Unquestionably the Russians are deeply interested in China and are following American policy closely. But there is no evidence that they are giving material assistance to the Communists or that anything constituting Russian intervention in the civil war situation exists at this moment. There can be no guarantee, however, that such intervention will not develop in the future, if the Kuomintang-Communist conflict remains unadjusted, while the United States continues to pour out assistance to the Chinese government.

It is plainly of key importance to reach an understanding with the U.S.S.R. on China policy—an understanding which would extend the general agreement concluded with Russia and Britain at Moscow last November on the need for a peaceful, democratic China. Joint action would not only have a highly beneficial effect inside China, but would contribute to breaking the log-jam in world affairs.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(The second of two articles on American policy in China.)


NEW FPA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Miss Helen M. Daggett has been appointed Executive Secretary of the Association. During the past four years Miss Daggett was in close touch with the activities of a number of government agencies. She joined the War Production Board in 1942 as Senior Administrative Analyst, and her work in the Personnel Division involved personal contacts with hundreds of WPB employees. She also acted as WPB representative in committee work with other government and civilian agencies and groups. Before going to Washington, Miss Daggett was associated for several years with the Bigelow Sanford Company, traveling from coast to coast in connection with lectures and public relations work. She has had wide experience in addressing many organizations, including clubs, schools, labor groups, industrialists, and others.

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Washington News Letter



U.S. BACKS YUGOSLAV RELIEF DESPITE PLANE INCIDENT

The United States will continue to send UNRRA aid to Yugoslavia despite strong opposition from the International Longshoremen's Association (AFL), which is refusing to load ships for Yugoslav ports, and from Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, who protested to the State Department on September 9 against shipments of goods of any kind to Marshal Tito. William L. Clayton, Acting Secretary of State, declared on September 12 that the United States refuses to halt UNRRA supplies in retaliation against Yugoslavia for the shooting down of unarmed American transport planes last month, because such action would violate the obligations this country assumed when it agreed to participate in the international relief organization. As Mr. Clayton pointed out, UNRRA is operated by 48 nations and cannot be regarded as an instrument of American foreign policy, although the United States contributes 72 per cent of its total funds.

CONSIDERATIONS SHAPING POLICY: Mr. Clayton based his statement of policy primarily on the view that the United States should strongly support the principle of faithful fulfilment of international obligations. During the present period of serious tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and other parts of the world, the Acting Secretary is convinced that the United States will best serve its fundamental national interests if it champions the view that all changes in the *status quo* must be made by means of negotiations rather than by unilateral action.

While chiefly concerned with maintaining the principle of honoring treaty obligations the State Department might nevertheless have found it difficult to approve continued relief shipments to Yugoslavia if its experts on UNRRA affairs had felt that this decision would undermine Washington's present firm policy toward Belgrade. In their opinion, however, the 88 or 90,000,000 dollars worth of supplies scheduled for delivery to Yugoslavia before UNRRA completes its work at the end of this year could make only a very indirect contribution, if any, to the country's present military strength. According to present plans, Yugoslavia will receive principally food, clothing, shoes, seeds, fertilizers and agricultural implements, and only small quantities of railroad equipment, trucks and tractors. Because of the current drought in some of the most productive farm areas of the country, Bel-

grade may be obliged to order additional food at the expense of such equipment.

The State Department also found that Yugoslavia is not, as reported in some quarters, obtaining supplies at the expense of other nations in whose reconstruction the United States is deeply interested. Although the Yugoslav government was recently assigned a quantity of steel rails originally earmarked for China, the State Department announced on September 9 that the rails in question had been diverted to Belgrade because Chinese ports were at present unable to receive them, and that UNRRA has an additional supply of rails on hand for China as soon as it is able to handle them. Moreover, the United States, which issues licenses for the shipment of all UNRRA goods from this country, did not permit UNRRA to reassign scarce and vital rail accessories and is now holding them in reserve for China.

RECORD GENERALLY SATISFACTORY. The belief that the United States enjoys the good will of large numbers of Yugoslavs through continued support of UNRRA, together with the conviction that the bulk of the organization's supplies is being fairly distributed by Marshal Tito's government, have also influenced Washington's determination to continue relief shipments. According to American officials of UNRRA who have just returned to Washington after a six-weeks inspection tour of areas receiving UNRRA aid, at least those Yugoslavs who live in towns and cities are informed by large posters of the source of UNRRA's income and are thus made aware of the rôle of the United States in providing relief. While conceding that some of UNRRA's supplies have found their way into the hands of the military, these officials believe that the amounts are small. In their opinion the casual observers who have charged that UNRRA supplies are being diverted to the army are unaware that Yugoslavia—lacking an adequate number of skilled workmen—is obliged to employ its military personnel in reconstruction. In the light of all these considerations, the State Department sees no contradiction in its determination to continue approval of UNRRA aid to the Yugoslav people and at the same time maintain an inflexible attitude toward Marshal Tito's government on other issues.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL